Introduction
In 2021, the United States had nearly 71,000 drug overdose deaths involving synthetic opioids — “more deaths than from any other type of opioid.” More shockingly, the number of overdose deaths involving synthetic opioids in 2021 was nearly 23 times that in 2013. Congress passed the Synthetics Trafficking and Overdose Prevention Act of 2018 (STOP Act) to enhance the Department of Homeland Security’s U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) efforts to combat the issue of synthetic opioids entering the United States via international mail and parcel service. However, CBP failed to fully implement STOP or record enforcement actions other than seizures, which affects targeting data metrics. The Department of Homeland Security’s Office of Inspector General (DHS OIG) found that CBP failed to properly implement STOP in curbing illegal narcotics trafficking through the mail, thus allowing dangerous goods to enter the United States, potentially fueling the opioid epidemic.
Illegal Narcotics in the Mail System
Illegal narcotics trafficking through mail and parcel services is not a new issue, but it is becoming more prevalent. CBP and the U.S. Postal Service (USPS) are jointly responsible for interdicting illegal drugs entering the United States through international mail. In Fiscal Year 2023, USPS and CBP seized over 4,000 lbs of synthetic opioids alone. To combat illegal trafficking, certain mail entering the United States must include information, known as advance electronic data (AED), about “the shipper, the recipient, and the contents of a cross border postal package.”
CBP uses AED in a “multilayered screening process” at nine international mail facilities (IMFs) to interdict illegal contraband by analyzing prior violations, country risks, and other intelligence. A hold is placed once a package is identified, and USPS pulls it for CBP physical inspection. CBP then decides what enforcement actions to take by either seizing the package, returning it to the sender, or delivering it. However, before the STOP Act, USPS and CBP only required AED from private carriers to target high-risk shipments for inspection and seizures. A House of Representatives Ways and Means Committee fact sheet noted that AED “requirements [did] not extend to international mail shipments, creating a significant vulnerability and allowing criminals to ship synthetic opioids into the United States with ease.” A loophole existed within the international mail system that needed to be addressed.
Congressional Efforts to Address Opioid Trafficking
Congress’s desire to interdict illegal narcotics at international mail facilities led to the passage of the STOP Act, which enhanced AED requirements and provided CBP with specific enforcement mechanisms when screening mail. Specifically, STOP required that CBP and USPS collaborate and mandate AED on at least 70 percent of international mail by December 31, 2018, and 100 percent by December 31, 2020, before a piece of mail reaches a port of entry. Congress sought to increase AED data for CBP to target “high-risk shipments, including those containing synthetic opioids, for inspection and seizure.” STOP also requires CBP to (1) justify all AED waivers; (2) enforce civil penalties against USPS for accepting mail without AED; and (3) report to Congress about implementation progress. Through the STOP Act, Congress sought to enhance USPS and CBP capabilities to protect Americans from illegal international mail while holding these agencies accountable through reporting procedures and civil penalties.
OIG Review
In September 2023, DHS OIG released a report finding CBP allowed inadmissible mail into the United States. CBP never enforced penalties against USPS for accepting incomplete AED packages and failed to record enforcement actions. Ultimately, the report faulted CBP for not fully implementing the STOP Act and failing to screen international mail accurately—putting Americans at an increased risk of harm.
First, OIG discovered that CBP did not assign central responsibility for evaluating its screening process, quality checking AED, or raising issues with other stakeholders (USPS and U.S. Department of State (DOS)). Two out of nine IMFs “did not place any mail on hold” due to incomplete AED—something that should have been raised with USPS. CBP had not raised AED quality issues with USPS or the DOS to ensure compliance with U.S. regulations. Additionally, CBP had not analyzed how effective AED targeting and manual mail screening were in identifying inadmissible mail across IMFs per generally accepted performance monitoring guidelines. The report noted that “[t]hese problems occurred because CBP did not assign responsibility for evaluating mail screening effectiveness and monitoring and resolving AED quality issues . . . limit[ing] its ability to identify and seize drugs at IMFs . . . from countries sending poor quality data.” No office of primary responsibility to coordinate mail screening led to an ineffective program, inconsistent guidance, and a failure to record enforcement actions. CBP officers did not follow consistent protocols for entering data on packages. They did not have a system to track actions that did not result in a seizure—essential metrics for monitoring program effectiveness. CBP practices increased the risk of “admitting dangerous goods” without effective screening and performance monitoring.
Second, CBP improperly granted country AED waivers and failed to impose penalties on USPS—failing to fully meet the STOP Act requirements. OIG attributed these deficiencies to the lack of formal assignment of responsibilities to any office. Under certain conditions, the CBP Commissioner may waive a country from the AED requirement. In 2022, 128 countries were exempt from it. OIG found that CBP did not obtain Commissioner approval for the waivers, nor did the office that submitted them have delegated authority to approve them. Additionally, CBP did not follow STOP Act requirements for issuing and reporting the waivers to Congress as required.
Third, CBP did not evaluate imposing civil penalties on USPS for accepting incomplete AED packages as required under the STOP Act. The STOP Act mandates that CBP penalize USPS for missing AED. CBP is only authorized to reduce or dismiss the penalty if USPS cooperates in a violation investigation. The report found CBP did not establish an office of responsibility to oversee the evaluation or issuance of penalties required by the Act. Critically, CBP provided no evidence regarding how it evaluated applying its “flexible enforcement” of that statute.
Recommendations and CBP’s Response
The OIG report suggested five recommendations to improve the mail screening process and fully comply with the STOP Act. Recommendation One suggests that CBP assign responsibility for ensuring STOP Act implementation, including (1) AED data quality issues, (2) waiver justification and documentation, and (3) enforcing USPS penalties. Consolidating these functions under one unified office will ensure that STOP guidance and issues receive proper attention and that any issues raised are resolved uniformly. CBP concurred with this recommendation, stating that Cargo and Conveyance Security will assume responsibility for these issues to ensure STOP Act compliance and share issues with USPS and the DOS. OIG commented that CBP still needs to address USPS penalty enforcement but considers the recommendation “open and resolved until CBP provides documentation” that these responsibilities have been formally assigned.
OIG Recommendation Three proposes that CBP update the 2001 International Mail Operations and Enforcement Handbook to include roles and responsibilities at IMFs and key performance metrics to assess mail screening effectiveness. The 2001 Handbook predates the creation of CBP and does not account for the use of AED or other mail operations procedures. CBP non-concurred with Recommendation Three, stating that it is updating the handbook but does not concur with including performance metrics because it continuously evaluates targeting methodologies for mail screening. OIG commented that CBP’s plan is “not fully responsive” because the investigation showed that without establishing key performance metrics, not all IMFs will be able to evaluate targeting/screening data for effectiveness (e.g., out of how many targeted and screened packages should opioids be expected or false positives). CBP’s failure to conduct screening evaluations will not allow the agency to understand the program’s effectiveness—a core tenet of program evaluation. This recommendation will remain “open and unresolved” until CBP documents a plan to evaluate mail screening effectiveness.
Conclusion
OIG reports provide Congress with information to ensure that the best laws are enacted. Without OIGs, CBP would be unaware of critical flaws in AED issues or mail screening procedures, which limits its ability to identify threats or impermissibly allow waivers to countries with a high-risk profile. OIGs are essential watchdogs to ensure agencies follow the regulations prescribed by Congress. OIGs must continue to be fully funded and empowered to ensure government agencies effectively and efficiently perform their missions. This OIG report demonstrated that CBP was not following a congressionally imposed mandate, and therefore putting more Americans at risk of exposure to illegal narcotics.